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Abstract 
 
This paper offers a first ever theoretical studyof a unique financing instrument associated
with prominent emerging equitymarkets in South Asia. The instrument known as badla, in
local parlance, has two interesting aspects, which have been ignored thus far. Firstly, it may
serve as an information transmission mechanism and can be thought of as an institutional
response to information gaps in the emerging markets. Secondly, it creates newtypes of
rents, called “market microstructure” rents for certain market players. These rents are then
exploited to gain control of the governing boards of equitymarkets. Consequently,
institutional inertia is created which hinders the badlyneeded reform process.
Key Words: Information transmission; Signaling; Microstructure rents; Linked games;
Institutional inertia
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Information Transmission and Micro-structure Rents in Emerging 
Markets: The Case of a Unique Financing Instrument 
 
 
“[The information gaps] might change some of the performance characteristics, not to
mention the institutional structure, of markets in which theyappear.”
Michael Spence, Nobel Lecture (AER, 2002)
A unique financing instrument is associated with prominent emerging stock markets
of South Asia. In his paper, we showthat the instrument can be thought of as an
institutional response to the information gaps existing in these emerging stock markets. The
instrument serves to eliminate information gaps. In this sense, the instrument provides one
example of howinformation gaps change the institutional structure of markets in which they
appear. Furthermore, we showthat the instrument gives rise to ‘microstructure rents’1,
which are exploited bycertain players to control the management of stock markets. One of
the puzzling features of these markets has been the recurring episodes of, what is widely
believed to be, market manipulation byfewlarge brokers. It’s not just that manipulation
anecdotes abound, but careful empirical evidence also points to the same conclusion. See
Khwaja and Mian (2005) as one example, who document empirical evidence of market
manipulation bytwo large brokers in the Karachi Stock Exchange. The entire broker
communitysuffers due to the actions of fewlarge brokers in terms of reputation; however,
theystill fail to elect directors who would check such manipulation. We argue that ‘micro-
structure rents’ created bythe instrument prevent a majorityof small brokers from unseating
the directors who favor large brokers. Hence, attempted reforms that would check such
manipulation are stalled.
The rents arise due to informal rules surrounding the allocation of financing through
the instrument. According to North (1990), the interaction between formal and informal
rules is the keyto understanding whyinstitutional change is often characterized byinertia
and path-dependence. Here, we showthat the informal rules surrounding the instrument
interact with formal rules governing the election of directors to create institutional inertia.
The resulting institutional inertia has effectivelystalled the reform process in the stock
                                                 
1 The origin of this term is due to Echeverri-Gent (2001) 
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marketsof Pakistan. Furthermore, an alternative policyrecommendation arises when the
interactions between the formal institution of elections in the stock markets and the informal
institution of the instrument in question are taken into account. We showthat it maybe less
costlyto deter manipulation bydiscouraging small brokers from electing directors who favor
large brokers. This is in sharp contrast with the approach that is usuallytaken. Normally,
regulators attempt to carryout an investigation after strong suspicion of manipulation
emerges that creates sufficient public pressure. But, these investigations prove too costlydue
to various factors including the political connections of the accused, who happen to be large
market players. Such investigations, almost always, prove inconclusive because theyare too
costlyto be carried out properly.
In this paper, we model two aspects of the instrument; the information transmission
aspect and the ‘micro-structure rent’ aspect. To our knowledge, this is the first ever attempt
at theoreticallymodeling the important roles that the instrument has historicallyplayed in
prominent emerging markets in South Asia.
Ever since Akerlof (1970), it has been argued that information flows are necessary
for markets to function properly in a world of asymmetric information. If buyer and seller
have different information regarding the value of the item to be exchanged, a “lemons
market” mayarise. Unable to distinguish between high-qualityand low-qualitygoods, buyers
maynot be willing to paya price that elicits the supplyof anything other than the lowest-
quality items. Consequently, potential gains from trade maygo unrealized. A large number of
papers in economics and finance have identified various information transmission
mechanisms operating in financial markets. Ross (1977) identifies the management’s choice
of debt level as a possible indicator of true value to outsiders. Leland and Pyle (1977) point
out that the amount of self-financing byentrepreneurs can be a credible indicator of value.
Bhattacharya (1979), Meyers and Majluf (1984), Vermaelen (1984), John and Williams (1985),
and Miller and Rock (1985) are other examples of models in which managers successfully
transmit their private information to outsiders through various mechanisms. It is clear that a
properlyfunctioning equitymarket requires a complex set of interlinked institutions, both
formal and informal to strengthen information flow.
In emerging markets, the question of information transmission becomes even more
important since legal and institutional preconditions for proper information flowas pointed
out in Black (2001) typicallydo not exist. It is clear, even to a causal observer, that ground
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realitiesin emerging markets are verydifferent from the developed markets. Howdo these
markets respond? Howdo theycontinue to function? Perhaps, emerging markets respond by
developing innovative information transmission mechanisms. That is, mechanisms unique to
them.
In this paper, we identifya unique information transmission mechanism operating in
South Asian equitymarkets. This mechanism is associated with the equitymarkets of India
and Pakistan and operates through a unique financing instrument. The instrument, known as
badla in local parlance, allows carryforward of open positions from one settlement date to
the next. The partycarrying forward its position pays a charge called the badla rate. An
example clarifies. Suppose an investor buys 100 shares of stock X on Mondayat Rs 1000 per
share. Assume the settlement system is T+2, which means that the payment and delivery
takes place two days after the transaction. That means, in our example, the investor is
required to payRs 100,000 on Wednesdayto the seller in exchange for the shares. If he does
not have enough funds on Wednesday, he could defer settlement till the next settlement date
(Friday) byusing the following process: The badla financier pays the moneyand takes
deliveryfrom the seller2, however, at the same time, the financier sells the shares to the
investor at a price in excess of Rs 100,000. Since the sale will be settled on the next
settlement date, the investor benefits as his open buyposition has been carried forward. The
financier benefits since the purchase price is set to be in excess of Rs 100,000. The
annualized percentage excess amount is termed the badla rate. The financier holds the shares
as collateral till settlement. The badla rate is determined through the forces of supplyand
demand, independentlyof the type of investor or stock. The fact that the badla rates do not
differ significantlyacross various stocks can be interpreted as evidence that moneyis
fungible.
Essentially, badla is an instrument that facilities a carryover transactions (COT)
through a repurchase agreement. An investor engaged in badla is simultaneouslyselling and
buying (a repurchase agreement) without changing his net position. The financier is
simultaneouslybuying and selling (a reverse repurchase agreement). However, the financier
                                                 
2 The per-share amount paid by the financier depends on the closing price on Wednesday. In our example, 
we assume that this price is equal to the price on Monday for simplicity. However, if it is lower, the 
financier pays the lower price and the investor pays the difference. Typically, the price paid by the financier 
is further marked down by a margin (2 to 5% in case of Pakistan) with the investor coming up with the 
difference. 
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isexposed to the counterpartyrisk. There is no wayof managing this risk between the
transaction and settlement dates since the clearing house does not guarantee this transaction.
The presence of counterpartyor default risk is the reason whybadla rates are significantly
above the risk-free rate. Specifically, the badla financier faces the risk of not being able to
recover all of his funds if the price falls significantlybetween settlement dates since in that
case the investor maybe forced into default. The value of shares the financier is holding as
collateral mayerode significantly. It is preciselythis risk that allows information
transmission to take place. It is important to note that badla financee does not have limited
liability. He is obligated to payback the amount to badla financier no matter what. However,
in a sharplyfalling market, the financee maybe forced into default. This possibilitycreates
counter-partyrisk for the financier.
In this paper, we present a signaling model of badla financing. We showthat if a
broker has superior information about the value of stocks, then he can crediblytransmit this
information to investors bychoosing the level of badla financing to provide in each stock.
Hence, badla mayserve as a mechanism of information transmission separate from the
obvious function of providing liquidity. The keyidea is that byproviding badla, the broker-
financier incurs counterpartyrisk. In equilibrium, this risk is justified if there is an increase in
the perceived value of the stock financed since this increase translates into higher
commission income for the broker.
Badla financiers are primarilybrokers. In its original form, badla allows rollover of
unsettled transactions from one settlement date to the next indefinitelyas long as the
investor can paythe financing costs. Badla appears strange in the context of a spot market
since it effectivelysuperimposes a feature of the futures market (settlement in the future)
onto the spot market. However, the interest rate in the futures market is the risk-free rate
whereas in badla transactions, the interest rate is significantlyhigher due to the counterparty
risk. The counterpartyrisk is significant and has resulted in various payment crises in both
India and Pakistan. In one instance, in May2000, several brokers in the Karachi Stock
Exchange (KSE) defaulted as share prices fell and badla borrowers did not payup.
Badla started as an informal, though legal, credit market serving equitymarkets in
South Asia. However, due to the counterpartyrisks involved, authorities in both countries
tried to do awaywith Badla several times. In India, after each ban, badla was started again in a
modified form with an objective of better managing the counterpartyrisk. Eventuallybadla
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waseliminated officiallyfrom Indian markets in 2001, however, it continues informally. In
Pakistan, badla continues under the name of Continuous Funding System (CFS). There are
plans to eliminate CFS. However, even if CFS is eliminated, it wouldn’t mean elimination of
badla since it would continue informally. Its elimination faces stiff resistance from keymarket
players. We show, in this paper, that keymarket players are able to mount stiff resistance due
to the ‘microstructure rents’ that badla creates. Byexploiting these rents, these market players
are able to gain control over the management of stock markets. This creates institutional
inertia.
Despite the important role played bybadla, little academic research on badla exists.
Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) report a negative abnormal return of 15% on badla stocks
after this financing facilitywas banned in India for the first time in 1994. Husain and Rashid
(2007) investigate the link between badla financing and the performance of KSE-100 index
and report a two-wayrelationship. Uppal and Mangla (2007) undertake a comparative
analysis of stock exchanges in Bombayand Karachi in the context of badla financing. All the
research on badla has been empirical so far. The lack of a proper theoretical framework to
guide empirical work mayhave been a reason for insufficient studyof badla financing. This
paper attempts to fill this gap and is, to our knowledge, the first ever theoretical studyof this
instrument and the various roles it plays.
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, an overviewof the prominent equity
markets in South Asia is provided in the context of the institution of badla. Next, under the
assumption of asymmetric information, we develop a signaling model of badla financing that
shows that the institution of badla maylead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (separating
equilibrium) in which superior information held bybroker-financiers is crediblytransmitted
to investors. Conditions are identified which lead to the break-down of such an equilibrium.
Then, we showhowbadla creates micro-structure rents for certain players. These rents are
exploited to control the management of the stock markets. Hence, institutional inertia is
created that hinders the reform process.
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1. South Asian Equity Markets and the Institution of Badla 
 
Themajor stock market in Pakistan, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), was established
soon after independence in 1947. KSE has been declared the best performing stock market
of the world in 2002 by“Business Week”. As of December 31, 2007, 654 companies were
listed with a market capitalization of Rs 4,204.522 billion ($68 billion) having listed capital of
Rs 671.29 billion ($10.88 billion). Average dailytrade value in KSE is around $400 million. It
is estimated that, in a booming market, approximatelytwo-third of dailytransactions are
rolled over through badla. The amount of funds available in the badla market is estimated to
be in excess of $1 billion at the peak of the market in 2007. Apart from badla, market
microstructure of KSE is the same as anydeveloped market. Trading at KSE is fully
automated and order-driven through limit and market orders. The counterpartyrisk inherent
in badla financing has caused various payment crises in KSE. In one instance, in May2000,
several brokers defaulted as keyinvestors refused to clear their payments due to the
continuous decline in the market. Badla financing can potentiallyworsen a fall in the market
since badla financiers have an incentive to withdrawfinancing in a falling market. This is
reportedlywhat happened in March 2005 according to a report bythe Task Force, which
was set-up to investigate the unprecedented decline in KSE after the March 2005 crisis. In
recent historyof KSE, badla related crises have occurred in May2000, September 2001, May
2002, March 2005, and June 2006. In viewof these crises, various attempts have been made
to eliminate badla financing; however, theywere stronglyresisted bythe market, particularly
bylarge brokers. Badla remains in KSE in the form of CFS even though there are plans to
eliminate it. However, elimination of CFS will not end badla as it is will almost certainly
continue informally.
BombayStock Exchange (BSE) is the oldest stock exchange in India. It was
established in 1875. As of November 30, 2007, equitymarket capitalization is $1619.18
billion with 4879 listed companies. BSE has an average dailyturnover of about $2 billion.3
BSE is an automated and order-driven market like anydeveloped market. BSE was the
largest badla market in South Asia for a verylong time. There were manycrises linked with
badla financing. In 1993, there were defaults linked to badla financing in BSE forcing the
                                                 
3 www.bseindia.com 
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Securitiesand Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to ban this product. However, badla was re-
started after strong resistance to the ban was shown bythe broker community. After the
March 2001 crisis, also associated with badla, SEBI banned badla officiallyfor good.
However, it continues informally. For a description of tussle between SEBI and broker
communityover badla, see Echeverri-Gent (2002).
National Stock Exchange of India4 (NSE) was established in 1994. Unlike BSE, NSE
was promoted byleading financial institutions at the behest of the government. NSE was the
first demutualized exchange in the countrywhere the ownership and management is
completelydivorced from the right to trade on it. This precluded conflicts of interests. NSE
initiallyrefused to allowbadla. However, in 1999, it allowed badla in a modified form called
the Automated Borrowing and Lending Mechanism (ABLM). ABLM was banned after the
March 2001 crisis. Hence, badla financing is nowofficiallypresent onlyin Stock Exchanges
of Pakistan. However, market participants argue that in India badla continues byinvolving
two exchanges where the first leg of the transaction is carried out in one exchange and the
second leg in another exchange to circumvent regulations banning badla. 5
 Typically, badla is thought of as an instrument that provides liquidityto the market.
However, here we showthat there is much more to the storyof badla than just liquidity
provision. Firstly, it can be thought of as a signaling mechanism and an institutional response
to the information gaps that are particularlysevere in emerging markets in the absence of
proper regulatoryand institutional framework. Secondly, it gives rise to market structure
rents, which maybe exploited to control the management of these markets. No wonder,
reform process in the stock exchanges of Pakistan has not onlystalled but back-tracked and
regulators had to fight a long and hard battle for reforms in the stock exchanges of India
(see Echeverri-Gent (2002)). In the next section, we turn our attention to the signaling
aspect of badla.
 
 
                                                 
4 Information about NSE is available at www.nseindia.com 
 
5 Some call it synthetic badla. See  www.bdshah.com/arbitage.htm  
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2. Signaling through the Institution of Badla 

The model relies on the idea that a broker who is also a badla-financier has superior
information about the value of various stocks. Since badla-financing generates counterparty
risk for the financier, the broker can crediblytransmit this information to investors by
choosing to provide different levels of financing in different stocks. The broker-financier has
an incentive to provide this information since such transmission increases the commission
income accruing to the broker. The model can be thought of as one of the long list of
signaling models inspired byAkerlof’s lemons market paper (Akerlof (1970)) and Spence’s
paper on education as a signaling mechanism (Spence (1973)).
Suppose different types of firms have issued shares that are traded in the market.
The number of shares issued byeach firm is N. Each firm lives for one period marked by
two points in time; time-0 and time-1. The profit of each firm is realized at time-1. A firm’s
profit, ix , is drawn from a uniform distribution [0,K] at time-1. The value of K differs from
firm to firm and is uniformlydistributed over [y,z]. There is a risk-neutral representative
broker-financer who knows the exact value of K for each firm. However, outside-investors
do not have this information. The broker-financier is assumed to strictlyact as an
intermediary(that is, the broker-financier does not trade on his own account). At time-0, the
total transaction value intermediated bythe broker-financier in a given stock is )( pVT where
0)(' . >T and pV is the price per share. For simplicityand without loss of generality, we
assume that (.)'T is a constant. .The broker charges a commission as a percentage of total
transaction value. At time-0, the commission received bythe broker in a given stock is
)(.0 pVTf where 10 0 << f . In addition, the broker-financier also provides badla financing
at time-0.
If the value of K is known, risk averse investors value each firm’s stock as:
)1(2 rN
K
Vp
+
−
=
λ where r is the risk free rate, and λ is the risk-aversion parameter.
Since K is unknown, investors, in the signaling equilibrium, infer the value of K for each
firm from the amount of badla financing provided in each stock:
)1(2
)(
rN
Ba
Vp
+
−
=
λ where
.0)(' >Ba
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So,higher the value of B, higher is the price of the stock. Consequently, higher must
be the realized value of ix at time-1 that ensures no loss for the broker-financier. Specifically,
time-1 profit of broker-financier is )(1 BXifBi Ψ≥×=π . There is a loss of 
)(1 BXifBe Ψ<×−=π , where KB <Ψ< )(0 .B is the amount of badla financing, 
i is the badla rate, )(BΨ is an increasing function of B , and e is a positive constant 
between 0 and 1. For notational simplicity (and without loss of generality), we assume 
BB =Ψ )( . 
 The optimization program of the risk-neutral broker-financier in each stock can be 
expressed as: 
Max 






×−
−
×
+
+×=
K
B
eB
K
BK
iB
r
VTf p
)1(
1)(0π  
The model proceeds as follows. Firstly, the risk-neutral broker-financier receives 
information about the K-value of various firms. The broker-financier then announces the 
amount of badla financing available in each stock. The interest rate on badla financing is 
exogenously given and is the same for all stocks. All of the badla funds are utilized by 
the investors. Proposition 2.1 shows that a separating equilibrium may arise in which the 
true K-value of each firm is revealed to the investors. 
.  
Proposition 2.1 If i is sufficiently small, there exists a separating equilibrium (a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium) in which the broker-financier credibly transmits superior 
information to outside-investors. In the separating equilibrium, the true K-type of each firm 
is revealed as  
wf
YiB
Y
wf
eiB
wf
iB
wf
iB
BaK
0
2
0
22
00
2)(4)( ×−+++




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+
−
== . 
 
Proof. The first order condition is
K
eiB
i
N
BaTf
)(2
2
1)((.).0 +=+×′′
Replacing NT /(.)′ with a constantw , and looking for a separating 
equilibrium )}({ BaKisthat = , we arrive at the following differential form: 
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00
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Integratingboth sides:
∫ +
+
=+ c
wf
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0
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0
2 )(2)(2
2
)(  
Using the linear approximation, B
aBaBa )0()()( −=′ , one can approximate as follows, 
2
)0(
2
)()( BaBBadBBa +=∫ . 
With the above approximation, and the value of i sufficiently small to ensure 
that 0>∀
−
< B
BK
B
e
i , we arrive at, 
c
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Here, we have imposed the boundary condition, ya =)0(  (obviously, no need to signal 
the lowest type through badla). The same boundary condition can be used to solve for the 
value of c also. It follows, 
2
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Proving badla creates counterparty risk for the broker-financier. All things equal, the risk 
is lower for high value stock when compared with a lower value stock. In equilibrium, 
this risk is compensated by the increase in commission income. Balancing of these costs 
(counterparty risk) and benefits allows a separating equilibrium to emerge. However, the 
separating equilibrium breaks down if the badla rate crosses a certain threshold 
( 0>∀
−
< B
BK
B
e
i  for the separating equilibrium to emerge). This is in line with the 
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anecdotal evidence from market participants who typically exhibit satisfaction with badla 
financing when the interest rate charged is close to the risk-free rate.  Also, in periods 
immediately preceding various market crises (for example, the March 2005 crisis in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange), the badla rate was very high. This indicates that perhaps an 
information transmission failure is also a contributing factor to market crises in emerging 
markets. 
 The signaling equilibrium may also break-down if there is segmentation in the 
badla market. That is, if different badla rates are charged in different stocks. However, 
historically, badla rates have not been significantly different for different stocks. This 
may be taken as an evidence of the realization of the signaling function of badla. 
 It is important to note that the equilibrium described here fits well with the 
empirical description of the market. There are two features of the badla market that 
appear puzzling. Firstly, the market is dominated by brokers even when there is no bar on 
the participation of banks and other financial institutions. This is especially true for 
Pakistan where authorities tried to encourage banks to participate in this market.  
Secondly, in normal times, badla rates do not appear high enough to justify the 
significant counterparty risks that it entails. These aspects seem to indicate that there are 
some indirect benefits of badla that only accrue to broker-financiers and not to outside 
financiers. The broker specific accrual may be due to the increase in commission income 
enhanced by the signaling function as described above. Obviously, outsiders cannot claim 
commission income. These indirect benefits also keep the badla rates low effectively 
making badla an infeasible investment for outside financiers.  
Next, we turn our attention to another aspect of badla financing. We show that 
badla creates ‘micro-structure rents’ for certain players. Due to these ‘micro-structure 
rents’, essential market reforms have been stalled. 

3. Micro-structure Rents and the Institution of Badla  
 
Typically, economists recognize two types of rents; innovation rents and intervention rents
(Buchanan (1980)). Innovation rents are rewards for innovation that arise in the context of
the market and are considered welfare enhancing. However, such rents tend to dissipate
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quicklyas others imitate the innovator. In contrast, intervention rents arise due to state
intervention and are considered welfare reducing. Echeverri-Gent (2002) argues for a third
type of rent called the ‘market micro-structure rent’. Such rents are said to arise when the
trading rules and institutions that comprise a market micro-structure benefit particular
market participants.
Badla providers are typicallya small number of large brokers. Badla is lucrative to all
brokers, irrespective of their size, since it magnifies their trading volumes and commission
incomes. Financial institutions such as banks typicallystayawayfrom the badla market due to
the substantial counterpartyrisks and separation of the lending function from the investment
function. Hence, market participants are generallydependent on a small number of large
brokers for their badla funds. Consequently, the institution of badla puts a fewlarge broker-
financiers in a privileged position. Hence, micro-structure rents are created.
To understand the significance of these rents, it is essential to understand the story
of attempted stock market reforms in South Asia. In particular, the storyof attempted
institutional reforms in the stock exchanges of Pakistan is a veryinteresting one. We tell the
storyhere with particular reference to the Karachi Stock Exchange, however, the description
is, more or less, applicable to the other stock markets in the region. There are two main
institutions in the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). The term institution here means “rules of
the game”. The rules can either be formal or informal. The two primaryinstitutions in KSE
are: a financing institution called badla, and a governing institution that specifies howthe
directors are elected. These directors form the governing board of KSE and are responsible
for smooth functioning of day-to-dayoperations. After the March 2005 crisis, policymakers
came out with a plan of reforms which was aimed at reforming both the above mentioned
institutions. However, both sets of reforms have been stalled due to resistance from key
market players.
Apart from the question of whythose resisting reforms have succeeded, there are
two related questions that must also be answered. Firstly, brokers themselves have argued
for and successfully implemented certain reforms. Reforms such as the introduction of
electronic trading, ‘dematerialization’ of shares through creation of CDC, switching from
‘quote driven’ trading to ‘order driven’ trading, and replacing periodic settlements with
rolling settlements were broker-driven. Without anydoubt, all these reforms have made
trading more transparent and safer byreducing opportunities of manipulation bybrokers
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andbyreducing systematic risk. Elimination of badla financing and demutualization (policy
maker driven reforms which the brokers are stalling) are also aimed at reducing manipulation
and systematic risk. If all the reforms have the same objective, howcome brokers forcefully
argue for some and stall the others?
It is also a common perception among participants and commentators that most of
the benefits of market manipulation go to big brokers who are not more than a dozen in
number. However, the reputational costs are shared bythe entire broker community. There
are 200 brokers in KSE alone (about 140 are active). If most of the gains go to onlya dozen
and the costs go to all, whydon’t the other brokers out-vote the manipulating bloc and elect
directors who would check such manipulation?
Here, we argue that all three questions raised above have a common answer. The
answer lies in understanding the interactions between announced formal rules and
historicallydeveloped informal rules. If we consider the process of reforms as a mere
transplantation of formal rules from developed markets to our markets, the questions remain
unanswered. But, if we consider the interactions of these transplanted rules with existing
informal rules underlying our markets, then things appear to fall into place and coherent
answers to the questions raised above are found. Along the way, we will see that the
underlying ‘rent structure’ that shapes the informal rules is verydifferent from what one
typicallysees in developing countries. Normally, rent-seekers aim to gain privileged positions
through favorable government interventions. The “SRO culture” in the industrial sector of
emerging economies is a case in point. But as far as the stock market is concerned, the
privileged positions have arisen endogenouslythrough market interactions. Hence, the rent-
seekers of the stock market do not want government interference in their affairs.
Consequently, the politics of rent-seeking is verydifferent in the stock market.
Let’s consider the third question first. Consider two games, one with formal rules
and another with informal rules. Initially, assume that the two games are not linked. The
formal game has legallyspelled out procedures for election of 5 member directors. There are
about 200 brokers who can vote. The informal game is one in which fewlarge brokers
decide howto allocate badla funds to other brokers. Badla is lucrative to all brokers since it
magnifies their trading volumes and consequentlytheir incomes. Of course, large brokers
with badla funds have complete freedom to decide who gets badla. If the two games are
separate, it is optimal for the majorityof small brokers to unseat member directors who
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favorlarge brokers in the formal game. But, bystrategically linking the two games, that is, by
making badla availability in the second game conditional on cooperative voting in the first
game, a fewpowerful brokers can manipulate the outcome of elections. No wonder, the
governing board of the exchange does not act to check manipulation.
The second question is nowfairlyeasyto answer. Broker-driven reforms are exactly
those that increase the component of the informal game in the pooled incentive constraint
across the two games. “Dematerialization of shares”, “badla market operating in parallel with
the spot market” and “rolling settlements”, all increase the efficiencywith which the badla
funds can be employed along with some mitigation of systematic risk. Both outcomes are
favorable to badla financiers. That is, broker-driven reforms are exactlythose that increase
the de facto power of alreadypowerful brokers. In contrast, regulator-driven reforms are
those that, if implemented, will weaken the component of the informal game in the pooled
incentive constraint across the two games. No wonder such reforms are stalled. Hence, the
brokers’ response to the two sets of reforms is entirelyconsistent.
The first question can nowbe answered. The institution of badla creates
microstructure rents (through strategic linkage across the two games) as described above.
Such microstructure rents are exploited to control the management of KSE. Consequently,
regulators cannot negotiate their wayto success with KSE management because powerful
brokers who run the showwill never accept elimination of their source of power through
negotiations. In short, when the institution of badla is targeted for reforms, powerful brokers
strengthen their hold on the governing institution and use their increased power to stall the
attempted reforms. That is, the institutions of badla and governance are inter-dependent.
Furthermore, the microstructure rent associated with the institution of badla has arisen
endogenouslyin the market and no government action was involved.
In the next section, we formalize these ideas in a simple framework.
The Model 
Suppose small brokers (S) have two voting options; theycan either vote for the directors
who are in league with large brokers who engage in market manipulation (V) or vote for the
directors who would check manipulation (N). For simplicityand without loss of generality,
we assume that the small brokers act as a group (theyhave solved their collective action
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problem).The wayS votes determines the outcome of the election of the governing board
of the stock market. The directors (D), once elected, can either move to check manipulation
(C) or ignore it (A). Manipulation results in rents equal to R to large brokers, however, there
is a reputation cost of manipulation to all brokers. Denote the reputation cost to large
brokers as lr and the cost to small brokers as sr . Figure 1 shows the extensive form.
Remark 1  In equilibrium, small brokers (S) vote for the directors who check manipulation.
We next describe the badla financing game. In this game, the large brokers allocate badla
funds to small brokers. There are n small brokers. Large brokers who act as a group make
badla allocation conditional on favorable voting behavior in the election game. The amount
of badla funds allocated to each small broker everyperiod in the case of favorable voting in
the one shot election game is denoted byb. Onlylarge brokers have badla funds. The total
amount of badla funds available with them are B. Badla is lucrative to all brokers because
theyearn a commission income on badla facilitated transactions. The commission income on
badla transactions of b is cb per period. Large brokers, if theyengage in manipulation, face
an expected penaltyof f in the form of fines byregulatoryauthorities.
Large brokers (who act as a group) earn an interest i on the badla funds theyprovide for
lending. If theylend badla funds directlyto investors theyalso earn the additional
commission income described above. If theylend funds indirectly, that is, theyprovide badla
to small brokers and small brokers then lend to investors, large brokers forego commission
income, since commission income accrues to small brokers in that case. Providing badla
involves counterpartyrisk, hence, large brokers’ interest income i is marked down bya term
e due to the expected losses arising out of the counterpartyrisk. Hence, the total per period
income to large brokers from badla activityof B if theylend directlyto investors is:
BecicBBei )()( −+=+−
If part of the funds is lent through small brokers and given that there are n small brokers
and each small broker gets funds equal to b, the total per period badla related income of large
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Figure 1 
brokers is: cnbBecinbeinbBeci −−+=−+−−+ )()())(( . The commission income
accruing to small brokers each period is cnb if theyget badla funds.
The two games proceed simultaneouslyand are infinitelyrepeated.
Proposition 3.1  An equilibrium in which small brokers (S) vote for the directors who favor 
large brokers can be sustained through strategic linkage with the badla game if and only if 
both of the following conditions hold 
0≥− srcnb           (3.1) 
lrfcnbR +≥−      (3.2)
Proof. Consider a grim trigger strategy: Both players cooperate till one player defects. After
that, cooperation breaks down forever. If small brokers vote (V) in the election game, the
net benefit with the discount factor of δ is given by
δδ −
−
− 11
srcnb . If (3.1) does not hold,
then small brokers do not vote V. If large brokers provide nb to small brokers in return for
S 
D 
D 
V 
N 
C 
A 
C 
A 
(0 , 0) 
),( ls rRr −−  
(0 , 0) 
),( ls rr −−  
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favorablevoting, the net benefit to large brokers is
δ−
−−
1
lrfR , and the cost is
δ−1
cnb .If (3.2)
does not hold, then the arrangement is too costlyfor large brokers. Strategic linkage is
beneficial to both parties if and onlyif both conditions hold.
 
 
Anti-Manipulation Strategies 
 
The punishment and reputation cost parameters lrf , and sr are taken as exogenous bythe
parties. However, one can think of the government as a strategic player that attempts to
structure the game so as to reduce the level of manipulation.
If punishment and detection of manipulation is costless to the government, checking
and controlling manipulation is trivial; the government onlyneeds to set the parameter
f high enough to ensure that lrcnbRf −−≥ . However, in general, it is likelyto be costly
to the government to monitor and punish those who engage in manipulation. These costs
mayarise due to monitoring, exacerbated bythe difficultyof collecting hard evidence and
pursuing a trial. There mayalso be political constraints and so on. The government mayalso
tryto increase the reputation costs of manipulation to brokers; lr and/or sr byproviding
information through media. One waymayinvolve government experts and regulators
appearing in front of media and sharing evidence. Another is leaking confidential reports to
newspapers. Obtaining such information and disseminating it mayentail significant costs.
For simplicity, we assume that the reputation costs are equal to both parties, rrr sl == . We
postulate a function ),( rfc that represents the cost to the government of achieving an
expected level of punishment of f and reputation costs to the brokers of r . Assume that
c(.,.) is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments.
There are two distinct ways of preventing manipulation according to proposition 3.1.
The government maymake manipulation infeasible for large brokers bychoosing f and
r such that cnbRrf −>+ . Alternatively, the government mayensure that small brokers
have no incentive to vote for the directors who favor manipulation. That is, byensuring
that cnbr > . The options available to the government are shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2 
Manipulation will be deterred if the government chooses a combination that lies in the areas
A, B, or C. The government’s optimal strategycruciallydepends on the shape of the
function ),( rfc (the shape of its iso-cost curves). As an example, figure 2 shows three iso-
cost curves. In case (1), the least cost wayfor the government to deter corruption is to make
it infeasible for large brokers, that is, byensuring that cnbRrf −>+ . In cases (2) and (3),
the least cost wayfor the government to deter corruption is eliminate small brokers’
incentive to vote for manipulating directors byincreasing the reputation costs; cnbr > .
 
Proposition 3.2 If 
],0[),(),0( rXXXcnbRccnbc ∈∀−−≤  
then the least cost way to deter manipulation is to choose cnbr =  and 0=f .
 
A 
B 
C 
1 
2 
3
i
cnb  
cnbR −  
cnbR −  
f  
r  
Feasibility constraint 
Incentive constraint 
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Proof. .If the above condition holds then it is costlier to eliminate manipulation bymaking
it infeasible for large brokers ( cnbRrf −>+ ) then bymaking it unattractive to small
brokers ( cnbr > ).

Proposition 3.2 highlights that it maybe worthwhile for the government to pursue a very
different anti-manipulation strategythan what is commonlythought. As one example, the
government of Pakistan, in one case, had spent million of dollars in trying to carryout
forensic investigation of the activities of large brokers after the March 2005 market crash,
widelybelieved to be the result of manipulation bylarge brokers. However, the difficultyof
collecting hard evidence in the presence of confounding factors, as well as constraints arising
from political connections of the accused, prevented them from building a case against those
involved. Alternatively, another approach mayinvolve increasing the reputational costs of
small brokers in various ways including encouraging media coverage of disgruntled small
investors, pensioners, and senior citizens who typicallyare the primaryvictims of
manipulation schemes. The government mayencourage publication of hard-hitting articles
that analyze howthe governing board of director is ineffective in checking manipulation and
howsmall brokers tend to vote for manipulating directors. Regulators mayhave a better
chance of deterring manipulation bydiscouraging small brokers from voting for the
manipulating directors.
 
Conclusions 
 
We have taken a detailed look at a unique financing instrument associated with prominent
equitymarkets in South Asia. The instrument known as badla maybe an institutional
response to the information gap existing in these markets. The information gaps in these
emerging markets tend to be fairlyserious since legal and institutional pre-conditions for
proper information flows are not present in these markets. Badla mayserve a useful purpose
byeliminating such information gaps. The institution of badla also gives rise to ‘micro-
structure’ rents, which are exploited bylarge borkers/badla financiers to gain control of the
governing board of directors. The board turns a blind eye to manipulation schemes run by
large brokers. It maybe worthwhile to pursue an alternative anti-manipulation strategy
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comparedto what the regulators typicallypursue. The alternative strategyinvolves
discouraging small brokers from voting for directors who favor large brokers.
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